Is Turkmenistan again moving towards Russia, despite EC visit?
The country with the world's fourth largest gas reserves, Turkmenistan, will host an unprecedented high-profie EU delegation on 14-15 January, lead by the President of the European Commission (EC), Mr. Barroso and the commissioner for energy, Mr. Oettinger. Before visiting Turkmenistan, they will first stop by in Baku. If the general perception is that Azerbaijan is prepared to supply the Southern Corridor initially with modest volumes, the story with Turkmenistan is quite different. The purpose of the visit is to move Turkmenistan closer towards the Southern Corridor, convince it to become a supplier to the EU's biggest Southern Corridor project, Nabucco. But will their visit to this capricious Central Asian country bring about any tangible results?
The EEO spoke with Michael Laubsch, Director of the Eurasian Transition Group (ETG), an NGO that published several in-depth papers about the situation in Turkmenistan and works closely together with institutions such as OSCE, the European Parliament and the European Commission. We asked him about his view.
What do you think of the oncoming visit of the EU delegation led by Barroso and Oettinger to Turkmenistan?
In general the EU would like to intensify energy relations with Azerbaijan, but also with Turkmenistan. Barroso has made clear that the EU's new foreign energy policy plays an important role. At the same Barroso and Oettinger will try to strengthen the bilateral ties between the EU and both Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan. Barroso has also said that in Ashgabat he will touch on the issue of human rights and the political liberalisation of the country. Personally, however, I am quite sceptic whether Barroso will discuss this topic. In general, no political breakthroughs or developments should be expected.
Turkmenistan on its turn is not really sure what to expect from the visit and what the EU delegation actually wants. If last year Ashgabat indicated that it was willing to supply gas to Nabucco, it now seems that Turkmenistan has lost interested in Nabucco. So I do not expect the visit will, in this respect, bring any concrete results.
The visit might also be an attempt to reach some short term goals. In early February there will be an EU Ministerial Meeting which will exclusively focus on the EU's foreign energy policy and energy security. Possibly, the EC wishes to obtain some 'black on white' approval from Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, which it can present at the Ministerial Meeting.
Why do you think that Ashgabat has lost interest in the Nabucco project?
Here in the West we are left to guess after the reasons behind this. It is a bit like in the seventies and eighties when were left to interpret statements coming from the USSR politburo. But there are two possible reasons behind this. The first is the old story that Turkmenistan does not have sufficient gas at hand to meet its contractual obligations. An other reason behind Turkmenistan's diminished interest for Nabucco could be its relation with Moscow. There have been some signals that Turkmenistan might be interested in improving its bilateral relations with the Kremlin again, which could mean that it would rather send its gas to Europe via South Stream.
Before Turkmen gas could start flowing into the Southern Corridor, some serious issues will need to be resolved. First, a logistical solution to ship Turkmen gas across the Caspian to Azerbaijan. Second, Turkmenistan wishes to sell its gas only to one entity, such as the EU initiated Caspian Development Corporation (CDC). In both cases Turkmenistan has indicated that the EU should come up with solutions if it wishes to receive Turkmen gas.
In December, the Turkmen President stated that the construction of a Transcaspian pipeline would only require the approval of the two countries whose territory the pipeline would cross, i.e. just Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan. According to this view, the interests of the remaining littoral states should thus not be taken into account. Russia and Iran have until now insisted that a Transcaspian could only be build after the legal status of the Caspian Sea would be resolved. However, according to some legal experts, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan have the legal right to realise the Transcaspian pipeline without any sanctions from the other littoral states.
Do you think that the statement last December by the Turkmen president that the construction of a Transcaspian pipeline is a bilateral issue between his country and Azerbaijan, is a sign of a new political course set out by Turkmenistan?
If we look at Turkmen politics in the past two decades, than we can only but conclude that such statements lay in line with the tradition of Turkmen heads of state. I would rather interpret this as part of Turkmenistan's classical "pendulum" policy. This means that statements made by the Turkmen head of state lose their validity after a month. Simply because within one month's time their interests change. And this is the fundamental problem in the EU's bilateral relations with Turkmenistan, which does not have a coherent policy. Different interests continuously emerge and possibly lead to changes in Ashgabat's foreign policy. The particular statement was made in December, but in January and February this interest could again have changed. When we look at the most recent statements, then we can see that Berdymukhammedov is again moving towards Russia. This shows that it is very hard to see through Turkmenistan's policy, which makes it hard for the EU to plan long term bilateral ties with the country.
A working group of the EC started a study last year into the most effective way to establish a the Caspian Development Corporation (CDC), meant to purchase Turkmen gas for European companies. Nabucco shareholders are involved in this study and supportive of the idea of a single buyer. The idea of a single buyer is not only a demand from the Turkmen side, but also a necessity if the EU wants to have a chance in competing with the two other regional powers in Central Asia, Russia and China, for the region's resources. Last year, China received 3.5 BCM through the newly build Central Asia - China gas pipeline. This number is bound to grow and to reach 13 BCM this year.
How do you assess the relations between China and Turkmenistan?
Compared with Russia and the EU, China enjoys an unproblematic economic relationship with Turkmenistan. In my opinion this is because China's relation with Turkmenistan, in contrast to Russia and even the EU, is not tied to any political interests. Russia for example simply wants to maintain its sphere of influence in the Caspian and Central Asia. The EU is divided by its desire, on the one hand, to decrease its dependency on Russian gas by importing Turkmen gas, but the other hand has to deal with a country that by its political ranking is comparable to North Korea.
In your opinion, could Turkmen gas supplies to the Southern Corridor be regarded as a contribution to the EU's energy security?
I think that it is important that the EU pursues a policy of energy security. It is good that Brussels initiates alternative projects to decrease dependency on Russian gas. But one should simultaneously raise the question that if Russia is the standard, then certainly it is more than problematic that the EU chooses for a partner like Turkmenistan, whose political environment does not allow it to be a reliable partner for the EU. More importantly, from an economic point of view there is the problem that actually nobody knows how much gas Turkmenistan really has, it is still a big state secret. Therefore it is difficult for Brussels to sign any agreements without knowing how much gas Turkmenistan is actually able to supply. These figures should be put on the table first. But not by the president, but by an independent company, preferably Western. This company should be allowed to conduct test drills in the areas, where the major fields are supposedly located. Ashgabat, however, until now refuses to do so.
